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Abstract. The regulation has the greatest role in forcing the intro-
duction and the establishment of competition in the fixed telecom 
markets by facilitating the entrants’ access conditions to the in-
cumbent’s infrastructure facilities (the local loop). Recently, the 
sole way to ensure the development of telecom industry consists to 
promote innovation and investment in network infrastructure tech-
nologies. This paper provides a critical review of both recent theo-
retical and empirical literature that address the issues of regulation 
on innovation and investment in the fixed telecommunication in-
frastructures. 
Keywords: bottleneck, access regulation policies, investment in 
network upgrade, service-based competition, facility-based compe-
tition. 
1 Introduction 
    The ultimate aim of regulation is to achieve the goal of ensuring effective 
competition in whole telecom markets (Oldale and Padilla 2004). There are 
two forms of competition: (1) the service-based competition, in which entrants 
provide their end-user services using the existent facilities of the historical 
integrated monopoly (the incumbent), and (2) the facility-based competition, 
in which entrants provide their services using their own network infrastruc-
tures. The later form of competition is argued to lead to more rapid develop-
ment of telecom markets by fostering innovation and reducing the need to reg-
ulation. But, the facility-based entry is impeded by the high investment costs 
(the sunk costs of building the telecom network infrastructures). This explains 
why the regulators in a number of countries are turned to promote the service-
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based competition rather than the facility-based competition, by requiring reg-
ulatory access policies generally in detriment of incumbent but in favor of the 
entrants
1
. In the short run, service-based competition reduces prices and en-
hances consumer welfares by eliminating progressively the discriminatory 
behaviors of the significant market power firms and inciting operators to use 
the network infrastructures in efficient manner in order to reduce their costs 
(cost reduction). In the long-term, service based competition may reduce or 
even impede innovation in telecom industry by discouraging investment in 
network infrastructure facilities. Therefore, the regulation-investment relation-
ship is complex when considering both short and long terms (static and dy-
namic). Literature on one-way access points out on the trade-off (dilemma) 
between static and dynamic efficiency. Recent contributions investigate this 
issue by focusing on the question of impacts of access regulation on innova-
tion in telecom industry. 
    The aim of this paper is to survey the recent theoretical and empirical con-
tributions on one- way access literature that focus on the impacts of access 
regulation on investment in new telecom infrastructure technologies (broad-
band technologies). 
   Given the extensive literature on this question, there are some researches that 
have interested in reviewing this literature. The most recent and complete sur-
vey on the relationship between regulation and investment is given by Cambi-
ni and Jiang (2009). These authors conclude that the impact of regulation on 
investment is ambiguous and further research is necessary to understand this 
relationship. In this paper, we seek to extend the proposal of Cambini and 
Jiang (2009) by focusing on recent contributions on this question and also giv-
ing more detailed analysis for the individual impacts of specific regulatory 
policies such as the vertical separation of the integrated incumbent on invest-
ment in new technologies.  
   The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the 
theoretical works that investigate the regulation-investment relationship. In 
section 3, we survey the empirical literatures on this question. Section 4 con-
cludes. 
2 Regulation and investment: a theoretical literature review 
   Regulation should simultaneously accomplish the following objectives to 
permit the development of telecom industry. First, regulation should promote 
competition in order to reduce prices and thereby enhance consumer welfare. 
Second, regulation should ensure efficient entry, promote investment in net-
work upgrade by incumbent and incite entrant to build its own network facili-
                                                          
1 See Ben Dkhil (2014 a) for a review and classification of these reforms. 
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ties when it is socially optimal to do in order to enhance quality of end-user 
services and thereby enhance consumer welfare (Cave and Doyle 1994)
2
.  
   Literature shows that there are conflicts between these objectives when con-
sidering both short and long terms. In particular, a number of researches point 
out on the regulation-investment dilemma (e.g., Laffont and Tirole 2000; 
Bourreau, Dogan and Manant 2010) suggesting that there is a trade-off be-
tween statistic efficiency and dynamic efficiency: access regulation has the 
advantage of promoting service-based competition and therefore increases 
consumer surplus and reduces prices in the short run (static efficiency). But, it 
discourages the infrastructure investments by entrants (facility-based entry) 
and the existent infrastructure owner (the incumbent), which delays and im-
pedes the innovation and reduces service differentiations and consumer sur-
plus leading to delay the development of telecom markets in the long term 
(dynamic efficiency)
3
. Indeed, for incumbent, a stringent access regulation 
may reduce its access revenue and therefore reduce its investment incitation, 
while for entrants, benefits earned from service based competition (experienc-
es, market shares) may exceed gain generating from constructing new infra-
structures in presence of access regulation and the high investment costs. The-
se entrants’ benefits due to service-based competition represent opportunity 
costs that lead to replacement effect to facility based entry in favor to service-
based entry (Bourreau, Dogan and Manant 2010).   
2.1 The impact of access regulation on incumbent’s investment 
incentives in network upgrade 
      The relationship between access price regulation and investment is a sub-
ject of debate across previous studies. Obviously, as noted by Chang, Koski 
and Majumdar (2003), this relationship can be seen in two different manners 
leading to two opposite results. On the one hand, access price regulation un-
dermines telecom investment by reducing directly access surplus of infrastruc-
ture owners through requiring lower access price. On the other hand, access 
price regulation promotes telecom investment as follows: requiring lower ac-
                                                          
2 Cave and Doyle (1994) note “There  are  three  main  aims  in  setting  access charges”: 
 -“The  promotion  of  an  efficient  (static)  level  and structure  of  access  prices”. 
- “The  attainment  of  dynamic  efficiency  through  efficient  entry  and  investment  decisions.  “ 
-“ To  allow  the  incumbent  to  make  a sufficient  return to  sustain  the  cost  of  social  obligations. “ 
3 Laffont and Tirole (2000) note that “There is in general a trade-off between promoting competition to 
increase social welfare once the infrastructure is in place and encouraging the incumbent to invest and 
maintain the infrastructure. That is, regulators must encourage entry without expropriating incumbents.”, 
p.7; and that   « There is then a trade-off between two considerations: "ex post efficiency," which goes in 
the direction of fostering competition through access beyond the level that would be spontaneously per-
mitted by the bottleneck owner, and "ex ante efficiency," which suggests giving the bottleneck owner 
flexibility in exploiting the bottleneck.”, p.137. Bourreau, Dogan, and Manant (2010) also note that: 
“Regulators therefore face a trade-off: while service-based entry promotes competition in the short-run, 
the full benefits of competition would be achieved in the longer-run only with facility-based entry to the 
market”, p. 683; and that “the trade-off between service-based competition and facility-based competi-
tion, i.e., ensuring that favorable conditions for the former does not hinder the latter”, p. 684. 
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cess price leads to lower prices for end-users services which rise consumer 
surplus and increases demand for retail services (enhancement of volume of 
calls and connectivity, etc.). This, in turn, leads to increase access surplus of 
network owners, which spur investment in telecom infrastructures. Therefore, 
the variation of demand in retail segment affects incumbent’s investment deci-
sion because it affects its profits. In imperfect markets where products are not 
homogenous (i.e. vertically or/and horizontally differentiated), the prices and 
thereby demand are different from those in perfect markets. Some papers have 
studied the case where incumbent and its rivals provide homogenous services 
(e.g., Sarmento and Brandão 2007). Others have focused on the case where 
retail services are differentiated (e.g., Foros 2004; Kotakorpi 2006; Brito, Pe-
reira and Vareda 2010).   
   Further, the timing when regulator can intervene to set the access price also 
affects the investment decision of the incumbent firm. In particular literature 
distinguishes two cases of timing of regulatory intervention to regulate the 
access price: (1) Ex-post regulatory intervention (No credible commitment): In 
this approach, the access price is assumed to be fixed by the regulatory author-
ities after the investment decision. (2) Ex ante regulatory intervention (Credi-
ble regulatory commitment) under which the access price is assumed to be 
fixed by the regulatory authorities prior to the incumbent’s investment deci-
sion. Under this assumption, the regulator is supposed to have certain ability to 
make an ex ante credible commitment.  
    Recent contributions also have analyzed the impact of access price on both 
retail competition and incumbent’s investment considering two different cases 
of industry configurations: vertical integration versus vertical separation of the 
monopolist provider of essential input (access service). In the case of vertical 
integration, the monopolist provider of the essential input (the incumbent) also 
operates in the competitive market by providing the final service while in the 
case of vertical separation (ownership separation), the monopolist network 
provider is forced to only operate in wholesale segment and, therefore, it is 
prohibited by authority to provide the end user service
4
.   
    All these studies model the different interactions and strategies followed by 
the actors in these related markets (incumbent, entrant(s), consumers and regu-
lator) using the game theory. Under different market circumstances (homoge-
nous vs differentiated final services, ex ante vs ex poste regulation, vertical 
integration vs vertical separation of the incumbent firm, etc.) results and con-
clusions may differ from one study to another. Nevertheless, it is always pos-
sible to draw some policy lessons. We present first the main studies that con-
sider only the case of vertical integration of the incumbent firm. Second, we 
review the literature that compares vertical integration to vertical separation. 
                                                          
4 In some countries, incumbents have chosen to apply voluntary this measure of vertical separation. This 
case is not the focus here. 
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2.1.1 The impact of the access pricing on investment and competition: 
The case of vertical integration of the incumbent firm 
Foros (2004) considers an integrated monopolist network provider and an 
independent retailer competing "à la Cournot" and having different abilities to 
provide value-added services in the competitive segment using the same input 
(the network access service). He considers two cases of access pricing: the 
unregulated case versus the access regulation without commitment. He shows 
that in unregulated case the integrated firm chooses an access price over the 
marginal cost of the network access provision to foreclose the market while 
the regulator sets the access price at/ or close to the marginal costs. He demon-
strates that under the latter case, the consumer and the total welfare may be 
reduced under some properties on investment costs and the integrated network 
provider chooses the over-investment strategy to foreclose the market when it 
has the highest ability to provide value added services (low spillover effect) 
while it has no incentive to invest in network quality upgrade when it provides 
retail service with value added quite similar to the one offered by its rival.  
Kotakorpi (2006) finds quite similar results. He considers an integrated mo-
nopolist network provider and a rival fringe
5
 competing “à la Cournot” and 
providing vertically differentiated services. He shows that when access is 
regulated (without commitment), the socially optimal access price should be 
equal to the marginal cost of the network provision. Compared to the unregu-
lated case, the integrated firm’s investment incentives are reduced, the under-
investment problem (i.e. relatively to the social optimum level) is worsened 
and the foreclosure may occur in the case of high investment spillovers (i.e. a 
high positive effect of investment on the competitors’ demand). However, in 
the absence of access regulation, low investment spillover undermines invest-
ment in network upgrade and may lead the network provider to foreclosure the 
market by setting too high access price.   
Mizuno and Yoshino (2012) also consider a setting similar to Foros (2004) 
but focus on the case where the investment spillover is low. They show that 
when the access price is determined by the regulator after the investment deci-
sion (access regulation without commitment), the integrated network provider 
uses the investment strategy to deviate the access price from its socially opti-
mal level (the marginal cost). In particular, it under-invests (over-invests) in 
order to force the regulator to set the access price below (over) the marginal 
cost if the investment cost is low (high).  
Sarmento and Brandão (2007) consider a different setting. They consider an 
integrated network provider and an independent rival competing “à la Stackel-
berg” and providing homogenous retail services. They compare three alterna-
tive ways to set the access price for the network access service: (1) the unregu-
lated access price (2) the cost-based regulation (3) the retail-minus regulation. 
                                                          
5 Group of independent rivals that have same costs and demand functions and therefore they have same 
prices and qualities. 
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Their main findings are the following. First, regulation prevents foreclosure. 
Second, the level of investment under deregulation policies is higher than that 
under the access regulation policies. Third, the retail-minus regulation permits 
better outcomes in term of consumer welfare and investment incentives in 
network upgrade than the cost based regulation.  
All these papers study the investment incentives if the regulator sets the ac-
cess price after the investment decision (no-commitment credible regime). 
Vareda (2010) and Brito, Pereira and Vareda (2010) also investigate the case 
where the regulator has the ability to set the access price before the investment 
decision (commitment credible regime). In particular, Brito, Pereira and Vare-
da (2010) consider an integrated incumbent and an independent entrant com-
peting with horizontally differentiated services. They study whether the two-
part access charge
6
 may solve the trade-off between static and dynamic effi-
ciency. They show that when the investment cost is low relatively to the in-
cumbent’s profits earned from investments, the socially optimal access price 
coincides with the marginal cost of the network provision and the regulator 
uses the access fee to promote investment. In this case, the trade-off between 
competition and investment is solved. However, when investment cost is too 
high, the investment even if occurs is not socially desirable while for interme-
diate value of investment costs, the trade-off is not solved: to induce invest-
ment, regulator must set an access price over the marginal cost which leads to 
foreclosure. These results are the same under access regulation with and with-
out commitment when investment cost is low or high. 
 Vareda (2010) assumes that the integrated incumbent and the separate en-
trant offer vertically differentiated services and that there are two complement 
kinds of investment in network infrastructures: (1) quality-upgrade (2) cost-
reduction. He shows that the higher the ability of the regulator to make a cred-
ible commitment in access price before investment decision, the higher the 
integrated network provider’s investment incentives.  He also demonstrates 
that the investment in network quality upgrade (cost reduction) is increasing 
(decreasing) in the access charge when investment cost is too high. Otherwise, 
the higher the access price the higher the investment incentive. 
 
      The first lesson that we can draw from these different contributions is 
that when the monopolist network provider is vertically integrated and there-
fore operates in the competitive segment, access regulation is necessary to 
avoid foreclosure and ensure competition. The second lesson is that access 
regulation may discourage investment in network upgrade when the access 
price is fixed at marginal cost of the network provision because in this case the 
fixed cost incurred by the incumbent is not covered. The third lesson is that 
when spillover effect is small, the integrated network provider over-invests 
relatively to the social optimum and may use this over-investment strategy to 
                                                          
6 All papers reviewed in this paper consider linear access price except this paper that assumes two part 
access tariffs, which consist on the linear access tariff majored by a fixed fee. 
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foreclose the market if the access price is regulated. Therefore, it seems from 
these different contributions that the trade-off between competition and in-
vestment is still unsolved. 
2.1.2 The impact of the access pricing on investment and competition: 
Vertical separation versus Vertical integration of the incumbent 
firm 
When there are conflicting regulatory targets, it may be insufficient to use a 
sole policy tool (the access price) (Laffont and Tirole 2000, p.125). As we can 
see from previous paragraph, access price regulation shows many limitations 
to solve the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. As a remedy, the 
regulators have recently turned from a regime that controls the behavior of 
incumbent to a regime that seeks to modify the incitation of incumbent 
through requiring additional regulatory tools that reduce or even remove the 
motivation of the network owner to discriminate entrants (Bijl 2005). Precise-
ly, policy makers and even certain academics suggest separating the activities 
that remain dominated by the natural monopoly properties (the network access 
provision) from competitive activities (provision of end user services) to help 
to achieve these conflicting regulatory goals (promoting both competition and 
investment). In particular, this solution is first applied in the USA since 1984 
to the incumbent operator AT&T leading to the creation of separated provid-
ers: seven Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) that provide only 
local loop access services, and competitive carriers that provide only long dis-
tance and international services. Another famous example of separation ap-
plied in most countries is the ADSL local loop which is generally owned by 
the historical telecom monopoly that only provides access service to the Inter-
net Service Providers (ISPs) that in turn only sell end user services (internet 
connection). However, the debate about the role of such practice in promoting 
both competition and investment is recently revived and intensified specially 
in Europe and OECD countries. The OECD recommendation of 2001 proposes 
different separation models that can be ranged from less to most intensive pol-
icy as follows: (1) Accounting separation which consists to create separate 
accounts for wholesale and retail services (2) behavioral or virtual separation 
(e.g. functional separation or operational separation) which is a moderate poli-
cy that consists in creating separate divisions for wholesale and retail services 
in the firm owned by the vertically integrated network provider. (3) The full 
structural separation which consists in creating separate ownerships for whole-
sale and retail activities. This recommendation was followed by series of re-
ports published by OECD in 2003, 2006 and 2011
7
. Conclusion reached by the 
authors of these reports states that there is no universal industry structure that 
is convenient to all countries, and therefore, the regulator in a given country 
                                                          
7 See (OECD, 2001, 2003b, 2006, 2011 a). 
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should evaluate and balance between costs and benefits of such practice before 
deciding the implementation of the separation policy. European Commission 
(EC) seems to have a quite similar position. In its access directive 
2009/140/EC, EC recommends to regulators to force separation as the last so-
lution in the case where other policy tools (e.g. access price regulation) fail to 
eliminate the discriminatory behavior of the integrated network provider. 
    Structural separation is recently a subject of extensive debates across aca-
demic literature. Economic researches point to the difficulties to conclude 
about its effects on telecom industry. In particular, there is no consensus about 
the importance of its costs and benefits in term of competition and investment.  
A number of authors (e.g., Cave 2006 b; Bijl 2005; Cave adn Doyle 2007) ar-
gue that structural separation by prohibiting the incumbent from operating in 
retail segment avoids foreclosure and therefore promotes competition and in-
crease consumers’ welfare. According to these authors, vertically separated 
network provider has neither incitation nor ability to discriminate retailers. 
Precisely, vertical separation removes anti-competitive behavior usually prac-
ticed by the vertically integrated incumbent against its rivals in retail segment 
that consists in providing the access service at high price (price discrimination) 
or degrade the quality of the access service delivered to its competitors (non-
price discrimination). Further, when the incumbent is vertically integrated, 
these discriminations are vertically transmitted from wholesale market to retail 
market by rising end-user prices and reducing quality of competitors’ retail 
services. Therefore, another benefit of separation is that there is no need for 
retail regulation. 
Crandall and Sidak (2002) and Crandall, Eisenach and Litan (2010) support 
the view that vertical integration structure is more appropriate for telecom in-
dustry.  In particular, these authors argue that requiring separation leads to 
losses of economies of vertical integration (economies of scope and scale, 
economies of costs of coordination between wholesale and retail activities). 
Indeed, according to these authors, first the telecom network infrastructures 
are highly significant and irrecoverable. Thus, the vertical integration permits 
more gain in terms of economies of scope and scale. Second, the telecom net-
work infrastructures present a high degree of asset specificity: these infrastruc-
tures are costly and only designated to provide telecommunication services in 
a specific area
8
 and thereby vertical integration is more convenient. Third, tel-
ecom industry is characterized by rapid technology and demand changes. This 
raises risk and uncertainty about market conditions, and thereby, generates 
important costs of coordination between wholesale and retail activities if these 
activities are negotiated between independent firms compared to the case 
where these activities are accomplished in a same vertically integrated compa-
ny. The first argument is based on the concept of the natural monopoly and its 
related notion of the sub-additively of the cost production function introduced 
by Baumol (1977). The two later arguments come from the developments of 
                                                          
8 i.e. these infrastructures (local loop networks) cannot be used in other sector. 
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the transaction cost theory that is originally funded by the paper of Ronald 
Coase (Coase 1937) and then reformulated and developed by Oliver William-
son (Williamson 1985)
9
. Coase (1937) points out on the failure of traditional 
conception on the economic system that considers that the sole way to allocate 
and organize the economic activities is the market through the price mecha-
nism. He says that this conception ignores the costs of market transaction ex-
changes due to incomplete information and uncertainty (e.g., costs of determi-
nation of relevant prices, costs of negotiations and conclusions of contracts 
between partners in the market). He considers the firm as an alternative organ-
ization of economic activities that co-ordinates and allocates economic activi-
ties through the called “managerial” or “co-ordinating function of the entre-
preneur”. However, according to Coase (1937), the return of this managerial 
function is decreasing with the size of the firm which may lead to waste of 
resources when an extra transaction is internalized (made in the firm). There-
fore, the decision of internalization or externalization of an extra transaction 
by a firm should be based on comparison of costs of market transaction (costs 
of externalization) with the costs uncured by the firm if it internalizes this 
transaction (costs of internalization).  The contributions of Williamson (1985) 
can be summarized in three main issues. First, Williamson (1985) adds various 
forms of contracts between partners as another alternative ways to market and 
firm to organize economic transactions. Second, he show that in reality that 
contracts between partners are incompletes and thereby generate costs of co-
ordination given the characteristic of human behaviors which consist on op-
portunism and the limited rationality. Third, he identifies three sources of 
transaction costs: asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of transaction 
and states that the vertical integration is the best organization when the degree 
of uncertainty, transaction frequency and asset specificity are high. Crandall 
and Sidak (2002) note that these sources of transaction costs correspond 
“plainly” to the telecommunications industry. The strong interdependency be-
tween retail and wholesale activities conjugated with complexity and uncer-
tainty of telecom market conditions lead to incomplete contracts between the 
separated providers of wholesale and retail activities which imply important 
contracting costs and therefore vertical integration is more appropriate to spur 
innovation in telecom industry because communication and coordination is 
ensured along different production stages in the same company.  
As responses to these critiques, Cave and Doyle (2007) say that these argu-
ments funded on transaction costs are unrealistic. In practice, the wholesale 
prices are controlled by regulator and the problem of difficulties to contract 
between separated wholesale and retail providers mentioned above can be 
solved by an appropriate regulatory intervention (e.g. price cap regulation). 
Further, these authors argue that the overall benefits of separation from com-
                                                          
9 See Crandall, Eisenach and Litan (2010); Gonçalves and Nascimento (2010) and Howell, Meade and 
O'Connor (2010) for further developments about arguments for and against vertical separation in telecom 
industry and their associated theoretical foundations. 
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petition are high relatively to costs of such measure. Cave (2006 b) seems to 
take more careful position. He says that regulator must proceed to benefit-cost 
analysis before requiring specific form of separation to the incumbent while 
Bijl (2005) recommends separation only after ensuring that there is an effec-
tive bottleneck  (essential facilities) that “cannot be  replicated due to signifi-
cant sunk costs 
10
. In line with these suggestions, Gonçalves and Nascimento 
(2010) propose a guideline for regulators before deciding to whether mandate 
or not vertical separation which take into considerations many aspects includ-
ing costs and benefits of separation, degree of market power of access service 
provider, the degree of complementarities between access and retail services 
and the strategic actions of different actors in telecom markets (providers, end-
users and regulators).  
Some studies model interactions between players in telecom industries using 
the game theory and considering both cases of industry structure: vertical sep-
aration versus vertical integration in order to compare costs and benefits of 
separation in term of competition and investment. Brito, Poreira and Vareda 
(2011b) focus on impact of vertical separation on welfare and non-price dis-
crimination (i.e. quality degradation of the network access service provided by 
incumbent). They assume retail competition with horizontally and vertically 
differentiated services. They find that vertical separation reduces non-price 
discrimination but it does not necessarily avoid it, and its impact on welfare is 
negative or ambiguous. Based on this last study, Brito, Pereira, and Vareda 
(2011) controverts the European Commission assertion that says that vertical 
separation avoids discrimination in the retail market. Sarmento and Brandào 
(2009) assume retail competition with homogenous products. They show that 
under vertical separation, there is no foreclosure in the retail market, but that 
the access regulation is necessary to stimulate investment when the retailers 
jointly do not have a high capacity to transform the quality access upgrades 
into cost reductions. Furthermore, Sarmento (2011) shows that the optimal 
level of investment decreases with vertical separation under both deregulation 
and the cost based regulation regimes.  
        It seems that neither benefits nor costs of separation policies are simple 
to evaluate. Therefore, the regulators face a delicate task. The debate persists 
since the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency is still unsolved. 
2.2 The impact of access regulation on entrant’s investment in network 
facilities 
These studies usually assume that incumbent cannot invest in new technolo-
gies because of the high sunk costs that result from its previous investment in 
local loop or because of regulatory obligations (e.g., Bourreau and Dogan 
2006). These contributions come as critiques of the ladder of investment para-
                                                          
10 In fact, technologies changes modify the notion of replication by reducing substantially the costs of 
these technologies. 
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digm which suggests an original regulatory schema for access price adjust-
ments over time that permits to promote service-based competition in the short 
term and investment by entrant in more long term. The next paragraphs de-
scribe this regulatory schema and review main associated critiques.    
2.2.1 2.2.1 The “theory” of the Ladder of investment (“the stepping 
stone theory”):  as a regulatory remedy to the competition-
investment trade-off 
    The “Ladder of Investment” (LoI) (or the so-called Stepping Stone) theo-
ry is suggested by Martin Cave in 2001 to European regulatory authorities as a 
remedy to the competition-investment dilemma, and then developed and de-
tailed in series of works (Cave and Prosperetti 2001; Cave and Vogelsang 
2003; Cave 2006 a, 2010). Since its apparition, it is the subject of an important 
debate across both academic theoretical and empirical studies and the regula-
tory reports
11
.  
    LoI can be defined as an incentive dynamic regulatory process for one-
way access. Initially, entry is encouraged by facilitating the access to incum-
bent facilities. Then, the entrants will be progressively forced to create their 
own network facilities as soon as their market shares increase and incertitude 
related to market conditions decreases. During this regulatory process, the en-
trants benefit from various levels of access conditions to incumbent’s network 
facilities. These access conditions must be “deteriorated” over time using ap-
propriate regulatory tools in a way that entrants will be forced to gradually roll 
out their own essential network infrastructures
12
. Cave (2006 a) mainly pro-
poses two regulatory alternative tools: (1) dynamic pricing policy that consists 
in increasing access pricing over time or (2) Making a credible regulatory 
commitment to suspend access regulation in a certain date (“sunset clause”) 
after ensuring service based entry. LoI approach, therefore, suggests reducing 
over time the replacement effect between the service-based entry and facility 
based entry using these appropriate access regulatory tools in order to force 
the passage to the facility based competition after certain date from imposing 
service based competition.  According to this approach, the service based 
competition must be used just by regulators as a “stepping stone” to develop 
facility -based competition in the long term by helping entrants to acquire 
market shares and experiences that reduce their incertitude about demands and 
costs before incurring high infrastructure investment costs (the stepping stone 
effect). The success of LoI process requires that this stepping stone effect of 
the service based competition dominates its replacement effect. Martin Cave 
uses “the investment ladder” metaphor, where the different stages of the so-
called “investment ladder” corresponds to ascendant levels of network invest-
                                                          
11 See Bourreau, Dogan and Manant (2010, 2011) for extensive review and consistent critiques for LoI 
approaches. 
12 The entrants are encouraged to “climb the investment ladder” as the regulator. 
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ment that entrants will be forced to “reach” over time as responses to modifi-
cation of incumbent’s network access conditions due to these incentive dy-
namic regulatory tools (see Figure 1 ). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Levels of access for the current broadband 
network  
Stages of entrant investment Ladder  
Levels of access for the next Generation 
broadband network 
 
 
Fig. 1. Example of the LoI
13
. 
2.2.2 The critiques of the Ladder of Investment paradigm 
     Despite the absence of any theoretical economic foundations for this ap-
proach, European regulatory authorities highlight the implementation of LoI 
approach arguing that this regulatory process is the best solution to the compe-
tition-investment dilemma. It suggests a practical regulatory method that pro-
motes service-based competition in the short run in order to achieve the ulti-
mate regulatory objective which consists in establishing facility based compe-
tition (Bourreau, Dogan and Manant 2010) 
    However, Cave (2006 a) confesses that the success of the implementation 
of LoI is constraint by number of delicate clauses including the abilities of the 
regulator to (1) intervene in appropriate date with appropriate policies in dif-
ferent “stages of the investment ladder” and (2) make a credible commitment 
to these regulatory interventions, which require complete information about 
market conditions (costs and demands). This supposes that the regulator also 
has the ability to range different components of network infrastructures (the 
local loops) from least to most replicable with respect to entrants.  However, 
the identification of degree of replication for given components of networks is 
difficult because the notion of replication changes over time and depends on 
several factors (economies of scale and scope, sunk costs, market technology 
conditions, entrant experiences, etc.). This particular question of the ability of 
regulatory authorities to make a credible commitment and related information-
                                                          
13 The rungs corresponding to different levels of access for current and next generation broadband net-
works (see, Cave (2006 a, p.84) and Bourreau, Dogan and Manant (2011)). 
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al problems are considered by Oldale and Padilla (2004) the main reproaches 
of the LoI approach.  
The other consistent critiques against this theory concern mainly the LoI 
regulatory tools and its hypothesis. They come from results of the dynamic 
theoretical models based on the game theory provided by Bourreau and Dogan 
(2006), Bourreau and Drouard (2010), Avenali, Matteucci and Reverberi 
(2010), Bourreau, Dogan and Manant (2010, 2011).  
Results obtained by Bourreau and Dogan (2006) dispute the LoI regulatory 
tools (the dynamic pricing rule and the sunset clauses). These authors model 
the setting where entrant can lease the existent local loop of the incumbent 
(service-based competition phase) before building new infrastructures (facili-
ties based competition phase). Under the main assumptions that only entrant 
can invest in new technologies while the incumbent is prohibited to invest in 
these technologies, that the cost of its adoption is decreasing over time, that 
the quality of retail services are vertically and horizontally differentiated and 
that only the quality of service provided by entrant depends on the quality of 
new technology adopted, authors find that the regulator should set a cost-based 
access price during the phase of service-based competition to maximize the 
consumer welfare and also the sunset clauses regulatory tool suggested by the 
LOI do not lead to achieve the facilities based competition because after sus-
pending access price regulation, the incumbent will protect its position as mo-
nopoly in wholesale segment by lowering the access price in order to increase 
the opportunity cost of technology adoption by entrant and therefore reduce 
the incitation of this later to build new infrastructures.  
The model of Avenali, Matteucci and Reverberi (2010) is close to the set-
ting of Bourreau and Dogan (2006) but it proposes two main extensions. First, 
authors consider that the service based competition phase is an essential step 
for entrant to acquire reputation and brand loyalty and therefore they relax the 
assumption that investment cost of alternative technologies adoption is de-
creasing over time. Second, authors test the fact that whether the LOI para-
digm is robust to regulatory commitment problem (i.e. the case in which regu-
lator can lift its commitment to suspend access price regulation at certain date 
after introducing the service based competition (incredible regulatory com-
mitment).  Authors show that a dynamic access pricing policy that consists in 
raising the access charge over time is necessary to promote efficient invest-
ment by entrant but it suggests asymmetric regulation that consists in seting 
different access charges to entrants that enter at different dates. Further authors 
demonstrate that sunset clauses delay the facilities-based competition. 
Results of the models, suggested by Bourreau and Drouard (2010), show 
that the stepping stone hypothesis is not always valid. Authors consider the 
cases where entrant can use the existent infrastructure of the incumbent or en-
ter with its own network facilities. In the first case, the market share of entrant 
is assumed increasing with its experience that it acquire gradually over time, 
the quality of service provided by entrant is assumed initially lower than the 
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one offered by incumbent and then it increases over time, the cost of adoption 
of new technologies is supposed decreasing over time and only entrant can 
invest in new technologies. Under these conditions, authors find that the ser-
vice-based competition does not always serve as a stepping stone for facilities-
based competition because the entrant may delay the step of facilities-based 
competition by prolonging the service-based competition step in order to bene-
fit more from market experience. Authors also show that in the setting where 
entrant and incumbent compete “à la Cournot” by providing vertically differ-
entiated services and when the market experience acquired by entrant depends 
on access price, a dynamic access pricing policy that consists to rise the access 
price over time does not always lead to accelerate the adoption of new tech-
nologies by entrant as advocated by LoI paradigm. 
 
2.3 The impact of access regulation on both incumbent’s and entrant’s 
investment  
   In our knowledge, until this date there are few papers that have been inter-
ested to study the impact of access regulation on the investment incitation in 
the context of one way access considering more realistic setting where both 
incumbent and entrant can invest in new technologies. In this paragraph, we 
summarize the main finding of two relevant contributions.  
Vareda (2011) addresses this issue. He considers a vertically integrated net-
work provider (the incumbent) that faces an independent entrant in retail mar-
ket. Given the access price regulation to incumbent network and the invest-
ment amount decided by the later, the entrant has two options: enter the mar-
ket using facilities of incumbent (service-based entry) or building its own in-
frastructures (facility-based entry). He shows that the incumbent’s investment 
in quality upgrade delays the entrant’s investment. In contrast, the incumbent’s 
investment increases with the entrant’s incitation to build its own infrastruc-
tures. He finds that access price regulation has ambiguous effects on both in-
cumbent’s investment and the decision of entrant to build its own facilities. He 
finally demonstrates that cost based price regulation is not always optimal 
when entrant benefits from a rise of its market shares or investment cost reduc-
tion during the phase of service-based competition. 
 Manenti and Scialà (2013) also investigate the case where entrant has two 
options that consist in entering market with or without building its own facili-
ties. However, they assume that the firms compete “à la Cournot” with verti-
cally differentiated services and the investment is assumed to have positive 
effect on demand for retail service (positive spillover effect). Authors also 
consider three ways to determine the access price: (1) unregulated access price 
(2) the regulator sets the access price after observing the investment behavior 
of both firms (access price regulation without commitment) (3) the regulator 
sets the access price before observing investment behavior of both firms (ac-
cess price regulation with commitment). Authors find the following results. In 
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unregulated case, the incumbent forecloses the market by setting high access 
price, and the facility based entry is possible, but it may be inefficient. The 
access regulation may discourage facility based competition at the date when 
this later kind of entry is socially optimal. This reduction in the social welfare, 
due to service based entry instead of facility based entry, is the highest in the 
case of access regulation without commitment. 
     To summarize, the theoretical investigations tend to point out on the neg-
ative effect on access price regulation on investment incentives. Next, we pre-
sent the main finding of the empirical literature on the regulation-investment 
relationship.  
3 Regulation and investment: an empirical literature review 
     Using different econometric techniques, measures, variables, models and 
different samples covering different regions and different time series, earlier 
studies reach different conclusions. We classify these studies following the 
measurements of the regulation used. First, we survey the empirical works that 
use aggregated and disaggregated measurements of regulation reforms (access 
pricing methods, unbundling policies, separation policies and others). 
 Second, we review the studies that measure regulation by its market out-
comes including mainly measurements of degree of privatization or market 
competition.  
3.1 The impacts of the regulation through aggregated and 
disaggregated measurements of reforms 
      Recent papers have been interested to study the direct (the stricter) im-
pacts of the regulation reforms on telecom infrastructure investment. Most of 
these studies are focused on the specific individual effects of one or two re-
forms rather than studying the global joint impact of the telecom regulatory 
reforms. However, as pointed out by Bauer (2010), the impact of a require-
ment of a given policy in a given country during a period of time, in general, is 
affected by other regulation policies mandated that may in turn have effects on 
driving or impeding telecom innovation. Therefore, we think that it is im-
portant to study both individual and joint effects of the regulation policies to 
better understand how regulation may affect telecom infrastructure invest-
ments in order to help policy makers to choose the most appropriate combina-
tion of policies and thereby determine the best regulatory intervention that can 
drive the development of the telecom industry in the best possible way. Never-
theless, there are difficulties to collect complete data for all or the most im-
portant telecom regulation reforms adopted in a given period of time for cer-
tain countries to construct a more complete analysis where several reforms are 
considered in the same empirical model.  In our knowledge, the unique paper 
that studies the global effect of telecom regulation reforms on innovation is the 
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one of Bauer and Shim (2012). This last study uses an overall regulation index 
that adds 41 indicators. Each one corresponds to an individual measure of a 
specific regulatory reform introduced in telecom industry including accounting 
and vertical separation, infrastructure sharing, the three kinds of local loop 
unbundling (full local loop unbundling, bitstream, sub-loop), access pricing 
regimes and others. These indicators are in general binary variables, each one 
takes a value of “1” if the correspondent regulatory reform is required by law 
in a given country and year. This index (known as Plaut Economics Regula-
tion Index) is computed for 32 countries (27 European and 5 others including 
Australia, Japan, Singapore, Switzerland and USA) over the period of 1997-
2010 by a group of experts and academics (Zenhäusern et al.)
14
.  
Based on this measure of telecom regulation and using the difference Gen-
eralized Methods of Moments (GMM)
15
 as estimation method, Bauer and 
Shim (2012) conclude that regulation negatively affects innovation measured 
by the number of secure services or fixed broadband subscriptions. Authors 
also find that the dynamic effect of innovation is positive and strongly signifi-
cant and the regulation-innovation relationship is non-linear. They also exam-
ine separately the joint impacts of both price and entry regulation reforms. 
3.1.1 Access price regulation and investment 
    Bauer and Shim (2012) find that access price regulation (as proxy by a 
measure that aggregates scores of price policies that concern both retail and 
wholesale services) undermines innovation in telecom sector.  
Distaso, Lupi and Maneuti (2005) also find that a stringent access pricing 
policy that consists to set lower access unbundling price promotes broadband 
diffusion in 14 European countries during the period from 2000 until 2004. 
Considering the case of 41 local telephone companies operating in USA 
over a period of 5 years from 1994 to 1998, Chang, Koski and Majundar 
(2003) estimate two relations. In the first model, the investment in infrastruc-
ture is measured by the share of a given company in fiber-optic (expressed in 
kilo miles). In the second model, investment is proxy by digital lines share. 
Including different controls such as number of competitors, firm size and oth-
ers and considering a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) as estimation method 
in order to deal with a number of technical problems of data such as the het-
eroskedastic and autocorrelated errors, Chang, Koski and Majumdar (2003) 
find that interconnection charge (expressed in minutes), which is the main 
measure of access price regulation used in their study, affects negatively both 
measures of telecom investment considered (fiber-optic share and digital line 
share). Authors therefore conclude that lower access price increases invest-
                                                          
14 See Zenhäusern et al. (2007, 2012 a, 2012 b) for further details about the methodology of coding and 
calculation of this index. 
15 This advanced econometric method is used mainly to deal with the problem of reverse causality be-
tween regulation and investment (i.e. regulation affects investment that in turn affects the former). 
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ment in new telecom technologies and give the following explanation: lower 
access price leads to more connectivity to networks and more service differen-
tiations, which imply more revenues for operators (cash flow). This, in turn, 
permits to enhance level of investment in both fiber-optic and digital technol-
ogies. In the second part of their paper, Chang, Koski and Majumdar (2003) 
analyze yearly data coming mainly from OECD telecommunication database 
1999 and European inter-connect Atlas that consists in information about in-
terconnection regimes implemented (FDC, LRIC and Cost-based)
16
 in 14 Eu-
ropean countries in the period 1993-1997. Authors deduce that both FDC and 
LRIC models do not spur investment in new infrastructures. Analyzing levels 
of interconnection charges and investment, authors conclude that in the Euro-
pean countries, where the level of interconnection charges exceeds the Euro-
pean average, the level of investment is the highest. According to Chang, Ko-
ski and Majumdar (2003), this result, that contrasts with their finding for the 
case of the USA is due mainly to the facts that the implementation of these 
methods of access pricing is recent in Europe compared to the case of USA 
and that the body of regulation authorities in USA exercise its missions in 
more independent way than in Europe. 
Waverman et al. (2007) construct an annual unbalanced panel data covering 
about 27 European countries during the 2002-2006 period. Combining data for 
prices of local loop unbundling, market shares of different technologies (cable, 
DSL
17
, Fiber) and using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) which per-
mit to control for reverse causalities, authors show that stringent access price 
regulation policy measured by lower unbundling price may promote broad-
band diffusion through increasing intra-platform competition via traditional 
platform technology(copper lines) but can lead to decrease in the total broad-
band penetration if the subscriptions via alternative platforms are still relative-
ly low. 
Seo and Shin (2011) consider a balanced panel composed of 25 local Ex-
change Companies in the USA during the period from 1988 to 1998. They find 
that lighter access price regulation which consists in requiring price cap meth-
od for access charge increases productivity growth in the USA telecom indus-
try.  
       Although some exceptions (i.e. Waverman et al. (2007) , and Chang, 
Koski and Majumdar (2003) for Europe case during the 1993-1997 period), it 
seems that there is a consensus across the studies cited above around the fol-
lowing conclusion. A stringent access pricing policy (requiring lower access 
prices based on the FDC or LRIC models), reduces telecom innovation. How-
ever, a lighter access pricing policy (e.g., requiring price cap regime) spurs 
innovation.  
                                                          
16 FDC: Fully Distributed costs and LRIC: Long Run Incremental costs (see chapter 1 for further details 
about these access pricing models). 
17 Digital Subscriber lines. 
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3.1.2 Entry regulation and investment 
  Few papers study the global joint effect of entry regulation reforms. In par-
ticular, Friederiszick, Grajek and Röller (2008) ; Grajek and Röller (2012) and  
Bauer and Shim (2012) use the Plaut Economics sub-indice that aggregates 
measures of entry regulation reforms (i.e. unbundling policies, line sharing, 
separation policies and number of licenses
18
) and find that entry regulation 
impedes telecom innovation.  
Friederiszick, Grajek and Röller (2008) consider an annual panel data com-
posed from 200 operators (grouped as incumbents versus entrants and mobile 
versus fixed lines operators) covering 30 European countries for a period of 10 
years from 1997 to 2006. Using both OLS and 2SLS as estimators of the effect 
of entry regulation on infrastructure investment, authors conclude that entry 
regulation do not affect investment in mobile sector, but it discourages en-
trant’s infrastructure investment and has no impact on incumbent’s infrastruc-
ture investment in fixed line sector. The major contributions of this study is 
that it uses data performance (infrastructure investment) disaggregated by kind 
of operator (incumbent versus entrant) and by type of telecom sector (mobile 
versus fixed).  
Grajek and Röller (2012) use a part of dataset constructed by Friederiszick, 
Grajek and Röller (2008) and estimate separate equations
19
 using both OLS 
and 2SLS methods with robust standard errors in order to study the strategic 
interaction between different actors in telecom markets (i.e. regulator, incum-
bent and entrants) and suggesting therefore an empirical investigation of com-
petition-investment dilemma. Authors conclude that entry regulation have 
negative impact on investment. Their results reveal that there are commitment 
regulatory problems (i.e. the higher the incumbent’s investment, the higher the 
regulation intensity). Grajek and Röller (2012) also find that there is a com-
plementary strategy between incumbent and entrants: an increase in entrant’s 
investment due to low entry regulation intensity leads to increase incumbent’s 
investment.   
Friederiszick, Grajek and Röller (2008) and Grajek and Röller (2012) take 
also into account the reverse causality between regulation and investment, the 
dynamic effect of infrastructure investment, and control for autocorrelation 
problems of errors terms. However, these studies ignore the non-linear regula-
tion-investment relationship. Furthermore, they do not take into account the 
effects of other telecom regulatory reforms such as price regulation that affect 
investment in telecom industry. They do not study also the individual effects 
                                                          
18 This last measure concerns mobile sector. 
19 The first equation explain entry regulation intensity as function of entrants’ infrastructure investment, 
incumbent’s infrastructure investment and other controls including per capita GDP and dummy variable 
that takes a value of “1” if there are no entrant in a given national market. The second equation explains 
incumbent’s infrastructure investment as function of regulation, entrants’ infrastructure investment and 
the controls. The third equation explains entrants’ investment as function of entry regulation and incum-
bent’s investment. 
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of entry regulation reforms (e.g. the individual effect of unbundling or the one 
of separation). 
 Impacts of unbundling policies  
       Some empirical studies find that unbundling policies have no effect or a 
negative effect on investment in telecom infrastructures.  Bacache, Bourreau 
and Gaudin (2013) test whether the unbundling policies can stimulate broad-
band investment by entrants. The ultimate objective of their study is to find if 
there is an empirical support for the Ladder of Investment Approach. To this 
end, authors construct data for 15 countries, which are member of European 
Commission, covering a period of 17 semesters from July 2002 to July 2010. 
They consider different specifications where the number of broadband lines 
owned by entrants is regressed on the number of local loop unbundling or bit-
stream lines managed by entrants and some control variables such as a meas-
ure of income level (the GDP), population and level of competition proxy by 
market share of incumbent in mobile telephone market. In certain specifica-
tions, authors also include another measure of regulation policy as an interact-
ed term with unbundling policy measure considered. This consists in an index, 
computed by Plaut Economy, which captures the regulatory intensity in tele-
com industry.  Bacache, Bourreau and Gaudin (2013) conclude that there is no 
support for the Ladder of investment approach because the service-based 
competition promoted by requiring unbundling policies does not contribute to 
stimulate entrants to construct their own broadband lines. In this study, the 
difference GMM estimator with time fixed effects is used in order to take into 
account the reverse causality between regulation and the telecom performance 
measure considered (the number of broadband lines owned by entrants). 
Applying the simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method with and with-
out fixed effects to panel composed from 30 OECD countries over 5 years 
from 1999 to 2003, Wallsten (2006) finds quite similar results. In particular, 
he concludes that a lighter unbundling policy which consists in requiring the 
full local loop unbundling or bit-stream access has no impact on broadband 
penetration, while more extensive unbundling policy (sub-loop access) nega-
tively affects broadband deployment. Crandall, Eisenach and Ingraham (2013) 
study effects of both unbundling policy and line sharing requirement on 
broadband penetration. Their study concerns 28 OECD countries covering a 
period of 10 years from 2001 to 2010. Results of different specifications using 
robust least square estimator show that unbundling of copper loops lines has 
no impact or a negative impact (in some regressions) on broadband penetration 
suggesting that unbundling undermine investments in new telecom infrastruc-
tures. In the rest of this study, authors deduce from analyzing the differences 
between unbundling of fiber lines and unbundling of copper lines that unbun-
dling of fiber platforms also impede NGN investments.  
Nardatto, Valleti and Verboven (2014) focus on the case of United King-
dom (UK). They construct detailed quarterly data for a panel covering the in-
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cumbent and about 5000 “local exchange” LE companies in UK during a peri-
od of 17 quarters from December 2005 to December 2009. Authors consider 
two telecom performance indicators, which consist on broadband penetration 
and broadband speed and different explanatory variables including the regula-
tory measures which are the different measures of unbundling policies (dum-
my that takes value of 1 if LLU policy is introduced in UK, number of LE that 
use LLU lines), the percentage of incumbent’s Bitstream lines relatively to 
total lines and the percentage of cable lines
20
. Other explanatory variables of 
both broadband penetration and broadband speed are included as controls such 
as income level (the GDP), ages and urban population. Authors also run dif-
ferent static and dynamic regressions using various estimators: simple fixed 
effect estimator and the system GMM. They conclude that intra-platform 
competition through LLU lines do not increase broadband penetration but it 
strongly increases broadband speed (quality of end users services) when en-
trants has more ability to differentiate their retail services than the incumbent. 
In contrast, the inter-platform competition (measured by number of cables) 
fosters both broadband penetration and speeds. 
This result is contrasted by the finding of Gruber and Koutroumpis (2012). 
Precisely, in this last study, authors conclude that full unbundling increases 
broadband adoption. They use more advanced econometric methods (Instru-
mental variables techniques), that control for reverse causality between regula-
tion and broadband penetration and consider a panel data composed of 167 
developed and developing countries from 2000 to 2010.  
Similar results are obtained by Martha (2005). In particular, results for both 
logit and OLS regressions for about 100 developed and developing countries 
in year 2001 show that unbundling policy improves broadband availability and 
the positive effects of this policy are more important in middle-income coun-
tries. Therefore, Martha (2005) recommends to regulators authorities of less 
developed countries to require unbundling policy and encourage competition 
in order to foster broadband adoption. Martha (2005) also shows that there are 
other factors that affect significantly the broadband access and explain the dis-
parities between countries. In particular, income level, population size, educa-
tion, price of computer, content (proxy by “number of domain name servers 
registered”), monthly price that end user pays to access to the internet, and 
competition
21
 affects positively the percentage of population that have broad-
band access.  
                                                          
20 The cable lines are a technology (platform) alternative to main and traditional technology used, which 
are the DSL networks (unbundling, bitstream, etc.). Therefore, considering number of bitstream lines 
measure in addition to the number of LLU lines measure in a same model imply that authors aim at study 
intra-platform competition (i.e. competition between firms using a same networks or platform (DSL) also 
called  services-based competition). Adding  the  percentage of cable lines as another variable in a same 
model means that authors also aim at study the impact of inter-platform competition (i.e. competition 
between platforms called also facilities based competition or known also as intermodal competition. 
21 Competition, privatization and unbundling are Dummies variables. 
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Grosso (2006) considers a yearly panel data covering 30 OECD countries 
from 2001 to 2004 and estimates generalized least squares multiple regression, 
in which the logarithm of broadband subscribers per 100 people is a function 
of a dummy for local loop unbundling implementation, the logarithm of the 
broadband subscribers per 100 people lagged by one-year to take into account 
the dynamic effect of broadband penetration,  and a set of controls that are the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index measuring broadband market concentration, the 
GDP per capita, and the fixed Internet penetration. Grosso (2006) finds that 
unbundling policy increases broadband penetration. He justifies this result as 
follows: unbundling policy reduces entry costs and therefore fosters competi-
tion and reduces prices of end users services, which increases demand for 
broadband services. 
     In sum, results of these studies are heterogeneous and led to opposite 
conclusions about the role of unbundling policies to drive or impede invest-
ment in new infrastructures.   
 Impacts of separation policies 
    There are few empirical studies that address the issue of the effects of 
separation policies on investment in telecom infrastructures despite the great 
debate across the theoretical academic and non-academic studies.  
Bruno (2012) collects yearly data for a panel composed from 14 European 
incumbent firms (3 separated operators plus 11 integrated operators
22
) operat-
ing in fixed telecom lines during the period from 2005 to 2010. For each com-
pany, author combines data including the total operational cost, the number of 
wholesale access lines which sum both narrow and broadband lines and the 
number of retail lines (the narrow band lines offered to end-users). Using a 
non-parametric econometric method, author computes efficiency scores for 
each incumbent operator in order to study the effects of introduction of func-
tional separation in terms of loss of economies due to vertical telecom struc-
ture. Through the comparison of scores of separated and integrated incum-
bents, author finds that separated incumbents show more efficiency in terms of 
economies of costs than the integrated operators. According to Bruno (2012), 
this may be due to several factors including that the implementation of func-
tional separation increases competition and therefore encourages incumbents 
to enhance their efficiency and performance. However, considering more ad-
vanced services (broadband services), the efficiency level of separated incum-
bents decreases because the provision of advanced services require a freely 
                                                          
22 The separated operators (with associated country) are Telecom Italia (Italy), TeliaSonera (Sweden) 
and British Telecom (UK). The integrated operators (with associated country) are Telefonia (Spain), 
France Telecom (France), Deutsche Telecom (Germany), OTE (Greece), TEO (Lithuania), Belgacom 
(Belgium), Eirecom (Ireland), Polish Telecom(Poland), Telecom Austria (Austria), Portugal Telecom 
(Portugal) & KPN (Netherlands). 
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circulation of information across units, which is more likely to be produced in 
the case of integrated structure rather than separation one
23
.  
Viani (2006) studies the impacts of vertical separation on the use of both in-
ternational and local fixed telephony and then he address their effects on the 
price of local fixed telephony. He collects data for a panel composed from 67 
countries that have privatized their telecom main operator (the incumbent) 
over the period from 1984 to 2003. Using robust fixed effect models clustering 
on countries, author finds that vertically separating the incumbent operator
24
 
from the international telephony segment has significant negative effect on 
both the expansion of international telephony
25
 and the expansion of local 
fixed telephony
26
. He also shows that the vertical separation of the incumbent 
operators increases the price of the local fixed telephony. 
    In conclusion, these studies also reach opposite conclusion about the im-
pact of separation policies on telecom industry performance. 
3.2 The impacts of the regulation through measurements of market 
competition 
   Earlier empirical studies and even a number of recent researches have ana-
lyzed the effects on telecom infrastructure investment of the regulation 
through its market outcomes
27
 such as measures of competition or others (i.e. 
privatization) rather than studying the stricter impacts of regulation reforms. In 
fact, regulation aims at encouraging entry to telecom markets by requiring ob-
ligations to incumbent in order to reduce its market power. Therefore, compe-
tition can be seen as a direct market outcome of different telecom regulation 
reforms.  This may justify why some organizations such as OECD and even 
some empirical academic studies use indicators of competition such as market 
shares of operators or a number of firms operating in a given telecom segment 
instead of using direct indicators of telecom regulatory reforms.  This common 
“belief” on the evident positive link between regulation and competition re-
flect in fact a conviction of policy makers that competition is a driver of 
growth (“laissez faire”). Gilbert (2006) says that: “The actions of the U.S. anti-
trust enforcement agencies reflect a judgment that competition is a spur for 
innovation."
28
   The same idea is shared by Bauer (2010) who reviews and 
                                                          
23 See Bruno (2012) for further explanation. 
24 The vertical separation policy is measured by a dummy variable that takes 1 if there are vertical sepa-
ration between the incumbent and the international service operator. 
25 The expansion of international telephony is measured by the “number of outgoing international 
minutes per person”. 
26 The expansion of local fixed telephony is measured by “the country’s fixed telephone lines in service 
per person”. 
27 i.e. these studies do not use direct measures of regulation but use measures of effects of regulation on 
telecom market in term of competition (number of competitors, market share of providers) or measure of 
privatization. 
28 Gilbert, R. (2006): “Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the Competition-Innovation De-
bate?” Innovation Policy and the Economy 6, p. 161.   
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comments the implications of policy instruments in term of telecom invest-
ment. He notes: “(…) regulatory measures required to facilitate the transition 
from monopoly to an open market environment. These reforms were based on 
the strong belief that competitive market organization would best support in-
vestment and innovation”29.  
    These studies that we will survey in the next paragraphs also reach oppo-
site conclusions. Precisely, estimating linear models, some works find that 
regulation has no effect or a negative effect on investment in telecom infra-
structures while others find positive relationship (see the paragraph 3.2.1). 
However, the studies that consider non-linear models demonstrate that the re-
lationship between regulation (proxy by a measurement of market competi-
tion) and telecom innovation
30
 (as proxy by amounts of investment in telecom 
infrastructures or broadband penetration) is more complex: it is an inverted-U 
relationship (paragraph 3.2.2).  
3.2.1  Competition and telecom innovation: as a linear relationship 
Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000) is a study “sponsored” by OECD31. This paper 
study the impacts of both competition and privatization on industry perfor-
mances in three telecom segments: domestic and international fixed and mo-
bile telephony services using panel data covering 23 OECD countries over the 
period from 1991 to 1997 and considering both fixed and random effects mod-
els. Authors conclude that competition (measured by the number of competi-
tors, the share of new entrants or the number of years to introduction of market 
competition) increases productivity and service quality levels and reduces 
prices of end-users services.  Results of this study also show that privatization 
has no effects on quality and prices of end-users services and “surprisingly” 
affects negatively the productivity. 
Li and Xu (2004) construct data for a panel composed from 177 countries 
over 1990-2001 period. Their study investigates the impacts of privatization 
and competition on telecom performances measured in several ways (telecom 
investment per capita, price of three minute local call, labor productivity, etc.). 
Competition is measured as follows: it takes value of “0” when both fixed and 
mobile segments are monopolistic, “1” where there is one competitor in fixed 
or mobile segments and “2 where there is a competition in both fixed and mo-
bile markets. Full privatization is dummy that takes “1” for year and country 
                                                          
29 Bauer, J. (2010): “Regulation, public policy, and investment in communications infrastructure.” Tele-
communication Policy 34, p.66. 
30 Innovation refers to “changes in the functionality of products and processes” (Stoneman 2008, p. 2). 
Investment in telecom infrastructures such as broadband networks is seen as innovation because it per-
mits to change the production process of services and leads to innovative services (see Bauer and Shim 
2012). Therefore, we use investment in infrastructures or broadband deployment to mean innovation in 
telecom industry. 
31 FCC (2009) is a survey for empirical works. It criticizes the empirical studies that are sponsored by 
some organizations. 
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that privatizes a part or entire telecom operators. Partial privatization takes “1” 
if the state ownership remains dominant. Using also different estimators 
(Fixed effects and two least square estimators with fixed effects) and trying 
different specifications, authors conclude both full privatization and competi-
tion considerably ameliorate the telecom performances while partial privatiza-
tion has no effects. Results also show that complementarity between privatiza-
tion and competition improves the telecom performances. 
Alesina et al. (2005) study the impacts of regulation reforms on investment 
for 21 OECD countries over the 1975-1998 period. Data cover seven non-
manufacturing industries including post and telecommunications
32
. They use 
the GMM estimator that controls for sector and country effects. Regulation 
reforms are computed as indexes that incorporate market shares of entrants to 
measure entry (competition) and market shares of government in incumbent 
operator as measurement of privatization. Their results show that both compe-
tition and privatization spur investment. 
London Economics (2006) is a report sponsored by the European Commis-
sion. This study investigates the relationship between telecom investment 
made by an operator (entrant or incumbent) proxy by tangible fixed assets and 
the regulatory index computed by OECD (or ECTA in other specifications
33
)  
using data for about 25 European countries over the 2001-2004 period and 
considering robust fixed effects models. Results show that high regulation in-
tensity promotes investment in telecom infrastructures.  
Djiofack-Zebaze and Keck (2009) study effects of competition and liberali-
zation on telecom performances considering three telecom segments (fixed, 
mobile and international telephony) in 177 countries (including 45 Sub-
Saharan Africa countries) over 7 years from 1997 to 2003. Measurements of 
competition, liberalization and regulation reforms consist in score for market 
structure (monopoly, duopoly or more than two operators), numbers of years 
from introduction of competition, dummy to measure degree of independence 
of regulatory authorities, numbers of years from instauration of independent 
regulatory agency, adoption of GATS
34
  and WTO commitments. Using dif-
ferent specifications and econometric methods (GMM, 2SLS, 3SLS, OLS and 
GLS), authors find positive correlation between liberalization and telecom 
performances measured by price of end-user services or number of subscrip-
tions.  
Bouckaert, Dijk and Frank (2010) consider panel data composed of 20 
OECD countries for a period of 17 quarters from December 2003 to March 
2008. Using simple fixed effects estimator, they regress the total broadband 
subscriptions on three competition variables which are the Herfindahl index-
                                                          
32 The post and telecommunications was considered a same industry before 1998 in most countries. 
33 These indexes incorporate mainly measures of market shares of different telecom providers. 
34 Country makes commitment to open to foreign competition. 
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es
35
 for respectively the inter-platform competition, the services-based intra-
platform competition and the facilities-based intra-platform competition. The 
control variables used in this study are the following: the average price of 
broadband connection, average speed of broadband connection, population 
dispersion, population density, GDP
36
, and Personal Computers penetration. 
Regarding the relation between access regulation (imposed to incumbent firm) 
and these competition variables, Bouckaert, Dijk and Frank (2010) say that a 
“strength” access regulation (e.g., low access unbundling price) leads to more 
services-based competition (i.e. low Herfindahl index for services-based com-
petition) and vice versa. However, a “weaker” access regulation (e.g., high 
access unbundling price) leads to weaker facilities-based competition (i.e. high 
Herfindahl index for facilities-based competition).  They reach the following 
conclusions. The facilities-based competition promotes broadband deploy-
ment, while the service-based competition discourages investment by incum-
bent and does not encourage investment by entrant sufficiently. Therefore en-
try regulation does not serve as “stepping stone” to facilities-based competi-
tion. In other words, Bouckaert, Dijk and Frank (2010) show that an extensive 
access regulation undermines broadband deployment. We consider that the 
main limits of their study are that it ignores reverse causality between regula-
tion and broadband deployment and uses inappropriate estimator method to 
estimate a dynamic specification.  
Distaso, Lupi and Maneuti (2005) find quite similar results. Precisely, using 
both theoretical and empirical models, authors show that competition in DSL 
market does not significantly influence broadband investment but competition 
between different platforms (DSL, fiber and cables) spur broadband deploy-
ment. This study is conducted considering unbalanced panel composed of 14 
European countries during 15 quarters from November 2000 to April 2004, 
and using three estimators (fixed effects, random effects and method of in-
strumental variables). Data set combine both competition data (Herfindahl 
indexes)
37
 and values of access prices.  
Gruber and Koutroumpis (2012) also combine direct measures of regulation 
(full unbundling policy) and measures of competition (Herfindahl indexes for 
inter-platform and intra-platform competition) but find opposite results. Con-
sidering panel composed from 167 developed and developing countries over 
the period from 2000 to 2010, using 2SLS estimator that deals with reverse 
                                                          
35 The Herfindahl index is a measure of degree of concentration in a given market. The higher the Her-
findahl index, the lower the degree of competition in this market. It is computed by adding squares of 
market shares. The Herfindahl index for inter-platform competition adds the square of DSL market share 
and the square of non-DSL market share. The Herfindahl indexes for services- based intra-platform 
competition adds the square of retail market share of incumbent and the square of market share of alter-
native DSL operators  while The Herfindahl index for facilities-based intra-platform competition adds 
the square of wholesale market share of incumbent and the square of market share of alternative DSL 
operators in wholesale segment.   
36 A measure of national income is the Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP). 
37 In this study, only competition variables are instrumented. 
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causality between regulation and broadband diffusion measure and controlling 
for country and year fixed effects, authors show that the competition between 
firms (intra-platform) that use DSL technology of incumbent substantially in-
creases broadband adoption while the inter-platform competition has little pos-
itive impact on broadband diffusion.  
Quite similar results were obtained by Denni and Gruber (2006) where the 
authors focused on the case of U.S Federal States during the period from June 
1999 to June 2004. In this study, different estimation methods are used (Fixed 
effects, Random effects, First Difference Instrumental variable estimator and 
Fixed effects GLS estimator). Authors find that both inter- and intra-platform 
competition increase broadband diffusion but inter-platform competition has 
the great impact.  
3.2.2 Competition and innovation: an Inverted-U relationship 
   According to our researches, only three empirical works (Heimeshoff 
2007; Briglauer, Ecker and Gugler 2013; and Li 2008) are used non-linear 
models to estimate the relationship between competition and telecom innova-
tion
38
. These works find that this relationship is an inverted U shape.  Econom-
ic literature provides both theoretical and empirical supports for this result.  
 The inverted U-relationship between Competition and innovation 
in economic literature: foundations and explanations 
     The relationship between competition and innovation is a subject of con-
troversial debate across economic literature. In particular, Schumpeter (1943) 
criticizes the Adam Smith’s conception of the “invisible hand” that considers 
the competitive markets as the best organization structure for economic activi-
ties. He argues that monopoly rents give firms more incitation to innovate, and 
therefore, monopoly structures are more appropriate to generate economic 
growth through innovation. Several studies support the Schumpeter’s argu-
ment and demonstrate that competition has a negative impact on innovation 
(e.g., Greenstein and Ramsey 1998; Culbertson and Mueller 1985; Aghion and  
Howitt 1992) while others find that competition spurs innovation (e.g., Arrow 
1962; Nickell 1996)
39
. 
Aghion et al. (2005) show that these opposite results are due to the use of 
linear models to specify the relationship between competition and innovation. 
They demonstrate that this relationship is in fact more complex. In particular, 
their theoretical model predicts that the overall effect of competition on inno-
                                                          
38 Telecom innovation in empirical studies is proxy by amount of investment in telecom infrastructures 
(see for e.g., Friederiszick, Grajek and Röller 2008; Grajek and Röller 2012; Heimeshoff 2007). It is also 
proxy by other measures (e.g., the broadband penetration, the number of lines of fiber-optics...). 
39 See Gilbert (2006) for an extensive literature review for competition-innovation debate. See also 
Loury (1979); Aghion et al. (2005) and Hashmi (2011). 
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vation is an inverted U-shape. Their empirical investigation applied to unbal-
anced panel composed from 311 manufacturing firms in the United Kingdom 
during the 1973-1994 period using non-linear estimator confirms their theoret-
ical predictions. Several recent empirical studies on competition and innova-
tion support the original finding of Aghion et al. (2005)
40
 (e.g., Innui, Kawa-
kami and Miyagawa 2008; Hashmi 2011; Goettler and Gordon 2014).   
 Aghion et al. (2005) and Aghion, Akcigit and Howitt (2013) interpret this 
overall effect (the inverted U-shape) as the “composition effect” of the two 
opposite traditional extreme effects of competition, Escape versus Schumpet-
erian effects. 
 
  
Fig.2. Competition and Innovation: an Inverted-U relationship 
 
      Figure 2 ullustrates this issue. In particular, the increasing part of the U-
curve shows the escape effect of competition, under which rivals are assumed 
to escape from competition by innovation in order to restore a part of their 
historical monopoly profits. Therefore, innovation is fostered for relatively 
low degree of competition. After a given certain level of competition (satura-
tion point), the Schumpeterian effect will dominate because for relatively high 
degree of competition, rents earned from innovation are not high enough to 
cover the costs of investment incurred by firms.   
However, considering a two stage game where it is assumed that a duopoly 
competing “à la Cournot” and providing differentiated products, Sacco and 
Schmutzier (2011) demonstrate that this inverted U-shape relationship be-
tween competition and innovation is only conceivable when firm investing in 
the cost reduction is more efficient than its rivals. However, this relation is 
negative when the firm that invests is less efficient than its competitors. 
 Competition and telecom innovation: a non-linear relationship 
    The few studies that investigate the linkage between competition and in-
novation in telecommunication sector support this result on inverted U rela-
tionship. Among that, we review the following works. 
                                                          
40 This paper is cited in most studies as the first work that suggests an inverted-U relationship between 
competition and innovation.  Hashmi (2011) cites others previous studies (e.g., Scherer 1967; Mukoyama 
2003) where this U-relationship was hinted. 
Innovation 
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 Heimeshoff (2007) investigates the impact of competition measured by an 
indicator of market shares computed by OECD on telecom investment using 
an annual panel data covering 30 OECD countries over the period from 1990 
to 2003. Using the first-difference GMM estimator two-step, the author finds 
that competition-telecom investment is an inverted-U relationship. 
Briglauer, Ecker and Gugler (2013) also use the difference GMM estimator 
but without fixed time effects and other estimation methods including the 
GMM-system, bias-corrected LSDV estimator and simple fixed effect estima-
tor. They consider dynamic non-linear regressions, in which the number of 
fiber lines normalized to population depends on a measurement of service-
based competition, two measurements of facilities-based competition and 
some control variables such as per capita GDP, population, annual labor cost, 
number of Internet users and ICT technologies normalized by income level. 
The service-based competition is measured by the percentage of unbundling 
broadband lines while the facilities-based competition is measured by the per-
centage of cable and DSL lines controlled by entrants and the percentage of 
subscribers of 3G Internet services. Panel data used in this study are unbal-
anced and concern 27 European countries for a period of 7 years from 2005 to 
2011. Authors draw the following conclusions: The relationship between facil-
ities-based competition and fiber technology deployment is an inverted-U 
shape while the service-based competition undermines investment in this tech-
nology. 
Li (2008) collects data on penetration, privatization, number of operator in 
mobile sector
41
, information on dependency of regulators on mobile sector for 
a panel composed of 29 OECD countries over the period from 1991 to 2006. 
Estimating dynamic non-linear regressions using difference GMM and 2SLS 
methods where mobile penetration is expressed as function on number of op-
erators in mobile sectors and dummies variables for mainly privatization and 
dependency of regulation agencies and controls such as GDP and population, 
the author finds an inverted-U shape between the measurement of new entry in 
mobile sector (number of actual operators) and the number of subscriptions 
per 100 habitants.  
Ben Dkhil (2014 b) constructed an annual panel data for 105 developed and 
developing countries covering the period of eight years from 2004 to 2011.  
Data are collected from various sources including mainly regulatory databases 
of the ITU and different publications (laws, decrees, reports, etc.) mainly com-
ing from the NRAs and OECD reports.  Regulatory data information collected 
include the access pricing policies, the separation policies (accounting separa-
tion and functional or structural separations), the unbundling policies (full lo-
cal loop unbundling, Bitstream, sub-loop and line sharing) and other regulato-
ry reforms including the incumbent’s obligations to make public the  access 
                                                          
41 This current literature survey focus on the fixed segment of telecom industry but we include this study 
on mobile sector given the limited numbers of empirical works in telecom industry that find an inverted 
–U shape relationship between competition & innovation. 
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conditions (prices and agreements), whether the incumbent is privatized, and 
whether the regulatory authority is autonomous in its decision (i.e. whether it 
has an independent regulatory body). Using this information and following the 
methodology of Zenhäeusern et al. (2007, 2012 a, 2012 b), we construct an 
indicator for each regulatory reform which is a binary variable that takes the 
value of one if the corresponding regulation is required by law in a given 
country and year and zero otherwise , a measure for access price policies and 
another for entry regulation policies by adding the indicators of corre-
sponding reforms, and an overall measure that aggregates the indicators for all 
reforms considered in this study. Therefore, these aggregated measurements 
measure the intensity of regulation required to dominant operator (the incum-
bent) (see Ben Dkhil (2014 a).  
In addition to usual estimators (the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the 
robust Fixed Effects (FE) estimator), we use the Instrumental Variables (IV) 
and the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM), including the Two Stage 
Least Square with Fixed Effects (FE-2SLS), Two-Step Generalized Method of 
Moments with Fixed effect (FE-2S-GMM) and GMM Continuously Updated 
Estimator (FE-GMM-CUE) robust to heteroskedastic and autocorrelated er-
rors. We take into account several considerations: the non-linearity of the reg-
ulation-broadband deployment relationship, the dynamic process of the broad-
band deployment and the unobserved heterogeneities across individuals (i.e. 
countries) and time period (i.e. years) by adding the fixed effects. These IV& 
GMM permit to overcome problems of omitted explanatory variables, error in 
measurements, as well as, the reverse causality between regulation and broad-
band deployment (the regulatory commitment problem) . In our knowledge, 
our study is the sole that uses the FE-GMM-CUE to estimate the regulation-
telecom investment relationship. It is also the first that suggests more complet-
ed analysis, by studying both the individual and the global effects of the most 
applied regulatory reforms on investment in both developed and developing 
countries across the world .  
  As regards to results, we obtain an original finding about the global effect 
of regulation . In particular, we show that the regulation-investment relation-
ship is an inverted U shape in the developed world, while it takes a U form in 
the developing countries . This means that in the developed countries, a low 
level of regulation spurs innovation in telecom industry, while a high level of 
regulation undermines telecom investment. However, in developing countries, 
regulation has a strict negative impact on telecom innovation. The differences 
in issues of regulation on telecom innovation between developed and develop-
ing countries may be due to the fact that in general, the existent fixed infra-
structures in poor countries are not already sufficiently developed compared to 
those in the richer world. Basing on this last result, we suggest the following 
policy recommendation: the government in developing countries should im-
mediately encourage facility-based entry by reducing or even stopping regula-
tion.  
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  Our results concerning the individual and the joint effects of the regulatory 
reforms provide more support for the inverted U shape relationship. In particu-
lar, our findings show that requiring an extensive unbundling policy (sub-loop 
access) or the most stringent separation policies (operational, functional or 
structural separation) undermines broadband investment, while a less intensive 
unbundling (full unbundling or bitstream) or a moderate separation policy (ac-
counting separation) increases broadband deployment.  However, our results 
for the impact of access price regulation show that the higher the intensity of 
the control of access price is, the lower the broadband deployment is. Precise-
ly, in the absence of access price regulation (no control), the broadband de-
ployment is the highest. A moderate access pricing regime, that offers a cer-
tain access margin for incumbent firm such as price cap or retail minus, per-
mits to reach better results in term of telecom innovation than stringent access 
pricing policies (the cost-based models). Most of these results about the issues 
of the individual reforms confirm both the previous empirical and theoretical 
findings including our results of the theoretical investigation provided in chap-
ter 3, among that, the findings that the structural separation and access price 
regulation undermines investment and innovation in the telecommunication 
infrastructures.  
We show further that both the Gross Domestic product (the GDP) and the 
population size contribute to explain broadband deployment. In particular, we 
find that a 10% increase in GDP per capita (population size) leads to an aver-
age increase of broadband deployment by around 14% (12.1%). This result 
confirms most previous empirical studies. 
 
4 Concluding Remarks 
      In this paper, we reviewed selected theoretical and empirical works that 
investigates access regulation-investment relationship in telecom industry and 
the key related debate. After the introduction of competition in fixed telecom 
service markets, regulation remains necessary to supervise and facilitate the 
entrants’ access conditions to the existent network infrastructure facilities (the 
local loop) which remain exclusively owned by the historical monopoly (the 
incumbent) in most countries over the world. These facilities constitute an es-
sential input to provide end-user services (e.g., Internet connection, long dis-
tance telephone service, etc.). Access regulation (i.e., access pricing, unbun-
dling and/or separation policies) raises questions about its impacts on invest-
ment in new network infrastructures across both theoretical and empirical 
studies. 
      Literature points out on the difficulty to solve the trade-off between the 
static regulatory goal, that consists in promoting competition (leads to service-
based competition), and the dynamic regulatory goal that consists in spuring 
innovation by both incumbent (upgrading the existent network infrastructures) 
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and entrants (building new infrastructures which leads to facility-based com-
petition) (Laffont and Tirole 2000; Bourreau, Dogan and Manant 2010).  
    Under different assumptions on costs, demand and access pricing (ho-
mogenous versus differentiated services, deregulation versus ex ante regula-
tion/ ex poste regulation, etc.) , interactions between different market players 
(incumbent, entrants, consumers and regulator) modeled using the game theo-
ry leads to various conclusions, although it is always possible to draw some 
policy lessons. In particular, a common result of this theoretical literature is 
that unregulated access price leads to foreclosure but implies better results in 
term of investment compared to the regulation case (e.g., Foros 2004; Kota-
korpi 2006; Sarmento and Brandão 2007).  
    In the last decade, much of the debate is focused on two main questions. 
The first one concerns the requirement of the structural separation policy to 
the vertically integrated incumbent and its implications in term of consumer 
welfare and incumbent’s investment in new technologies. The second key 
question concerns whether the ladder of investment approach is a solution to 
the trade-off between competition and investment. The literature gives differ-
ent answers to these questions but the trade-off is still unsolved, and therefore, 
further theoretical researchs are required to overcome and understand this ac-
cess problem. In chapter 3, we suggest a theoretical investigation based on 
more realistic assumptions compared to previous theoretical works.  
     Previous empirical researchs also fail to give final answer to impacts of 
access regulation on investment.  This was the conclusion of many researchs 
that have surveyed the empirical works addressing this question in telecom 
industry.  Heterogeneous empirical methodologies (different measures of regu-
latory variables, various measures of innovation in telecom network infrastruc-
tures, different control variables, different sample covering various time peri-
ods and regions and different econometric specifications and methods) leads 
also to opposite results, and therefore ambiguous conclusion. Obviously, con-
sistent data and robust methods to overcome many technical aspects and to 
take into account many particular considerations (i.e. reverse causalities be-
tween regulation and investment, heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors, 
dynamic process of telecom investment, etc.) , as pointed by  Cambini and 
Jiang (2009); Friederiszick, Grajek and Röller (2008) and FCC (2009), are 
necessary to understand the regulation-investment relationship.  
    Further, in our survey, we classified empirical works by type of regula-
tion (access price policy, separation and unbundling policies) to determine the 
particular effect of each reform required in telecom industry. We also classi-
fied these works following the regulatory measurements and specifications of 
the regulation- investment relationship (linear versus non-linear models). The-
se classifications lead to the following additional remarks: 
▫ First, it seems that the intensity of regulation plays an important role. 
In particular, regarding the impact of the access price regulation, our survey 
permits to draw the following conclusion: a stringent access price regulation 
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that consists to set lower access prices (cost-based approaches such as FDC or 
LRIC) undermines investment while a less intense access price policy such as 
requiring price cap model spurs innovation. However, the impacts of the un-
bundling as well as the separation policies are still ambiguous. In fact, there is 
no work that studies the individual effect of various levels of unbundling or 
separation policies, except Wallsten (2006). This latter author, indeed, studies 
the impact of different forms of local loop unbundling, and reaches an original 
conclusion. In particular, Wallsten (2006) concludes that a less intense unbun-
dling policy which consist to require full local loop unbundling or bit-stream 
access has no impact on broadband penetration, while more stringent unbun-
dling policy (sub-loop access) negatively affects broadband deployment.  
▫ Second, the specification of the regulation-investment relationship also 
plays an important role. Few works use non-linear models to specify the regu-
lation-investment relationship but consider measurements of market outcome 
(measures of level of competition). They show that this relationship is more 
complex: it is an inverted-U shape. This confirms the recent finding of both 
theoretical and empirical researches on the relationship between competition 
and innovation in the economic literature (see for e.g., Aghion et al. (2005), 
Innui, Kawakami and Miyagawa 2008; Hashmi 2011; Goettler and Gordon 
2014).  According to Aghion et al. (2005), the failure of the previous econom-
ic studies to reach common conclusion is due to the fact that these works use 
simple linear models to specify a complex relationship. However, although the 
obvious positive relationship between competition and regulation, Bauer and 
Shim (2012) find a non-invested U shape using a measure aggregating scores 
and dummies that measure regulation reforms. They suggest a strict negative 
impact of regulation on investment. In our knowledge, this is the unique paper, 
in which a non-linear model is estimated using direct measurements of regula-
tion reforms rather than market outcome measurements such as competition. 
We have many reproaches to this study that concern mainly three points: the 
econometric method, the sample, and the interpretation given by authors for 
some of their results). We will provide further details about these in chapter 4. 
   In our paper ((Ben Dkhil (2014 a)), we show that the relationship between 
regulation and investment is an inverted U shape in rich countries, but it takes 
a U form in poor countries. This means that in rich countries, a less restrictive 
regulatory policy spurs broadband deployment, while a stringent policy inter-
vention discourages innovation in telecom industry. However, in poor coun-
tries, the regulation has a strict negative impact on broadband deployment.  
Concerning the individual impacts of the access regulatory reforms, our em-
pirical results give more support for the inverted U shape relationship. In par-
ticular, we find that requiring an extensive unbundling policy (sub-loop ac-
cess) impedes investment, while a lighter unbundling regulatory policies such 
as the full local loop unbundling, bit-stream or line sharing drives innovation. 
In the same way, requiring extensive separation policies (operational, func-
tional or full structural separation) undermines broadband investment, while a 
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moderate separation policy (accounting separation) spurs broadband deploy-
ment. Our results of both theoretical and empirical investigations support the 
findings of the related previous works that access price regulation and the full 
structural separation requirement undermine investment in the telecommunica-
tion infrastructures. 
However, this study has a number of limitations we first do not use a dis-
aggregated measure for broadband deployment by type of operator (incum-
bent/ entrant). Second, given the non-availability of amounts of investment in 
fiber or broadband technologies, we use like the majority of studies the broad-
band penetration which may not reflect exactly the level of investment in these 
technologies. Additional researches are, therefore, required to further under-
stand the regulation-investment relationship. 
 
5 Appendix: Regulation and telecom innovation:                                                                                                     
A summary of selected empirical works 
Table 1. Impacts of access pricing policies 
Study Samples Econometric 
methods 
Measures of telecom 
innovation (perfor-
mances) 
Measures of 
regulatory 
variable 
Results and 
our remarks 
Chang, 
Koski and 
Majumdar 
( 2003) 
1/ 41 local 
operators 
in USA 
(1994-
1998) 
(annual 
panel data) 
GLS1 
(to control for 
heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelated 
erros) 
(static linear 
models) 
Share in fiber-optic / 
Share in digital lines 
access charge (in 
dollars per mi-
nute) 
1/ USA  (nega-
tive impact ) 
 
2/ 14 EU 
countries 
1993-1997 
(annual 
data) 
Simple analyze of 
data 
Investment in telecom 
industry (ITU data) 
Binaries variable 
for implementa-
tion of CB, FDC 
and LRIC mod-
els2 
2/ Europe ( no 
impact) 
(explanation of 
Chang et al.: 
The regulation 
is yet recent in 
Europe). 
Distaso, 
Lupi and 
Maneuti, 
(2005) 
14 EU 
countries 
2000-2004 
(quarterly 
data) 
FR (with time 
fixed effects), RE 
and IV (one 
control variable is 
considered is 
endogenous).3 
(static linear 
models) 
Broadband penetration Access charge 
(the price of 
unbundled local 
loop) 
Negative impact 
Waverman, 
Meschi, 
Reillier and 
Dasgupta 
(2007) 
27 EU 
Countries 
2002-2006 
SUR 4 
(to control for 
reverse causalities 
between regula-
tion and telecom 
innovation) 
(static linear 
model) 
The broadband market 
shares of incumbent and 
competitors  
Access charge 
(Price of local 
loop unbundling) 
Negative impact 
Seo and 
Shin (2011) 
25 local 
companies 
in USA 
1988-1998 
OLS  Measure of Productivity 
growth change in tele-
com industry  
Scores for regu-
latory regimes 
(price cap, rate of 
return,..) 
Lighter access 
price policy that 
consist to price 
cap regulation 
increase per-
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formance of 
telecom industry  
 Bauer and 
Shim 
(2012) 
32 devel-
oped 
countries 
(European, 
USA, 
Japan and 
others) 
1997-2010 
Annual 
data 
Difference GMM 
(with standard 
errors)5 
(dynamic  non-
linear models) 
Fixed Broadband pene-
tration / 
Number of secure 
service 
Sub-index that 
measure intensity 
of access price 
regulation 6 
Negative impact 
Ben Dkhil 
(2014 b) 
105 devel-
oped and 
developing 
countries 
FE-GMM-CUE 
FE-2SLS 
FE-GMM-2step 
Fixed Broadband pene-
tration 
Sub-index that 
measures the 
intensity of 
access price 
regulation com-
puted by author 
as descripted in 
Ben Dkhil (2014 
a) 
A moderate 
access pricing 
regime (price 
cap or the retail 
minus) permits 
to reach better 
results in term 
of telecom 
innovation than 
adopting strin-
gent access 
policies (the 
cost-based 
models such as 
LRIC or FDC) 
Notes:  
1. GLS: The Generalized Least Squares 
2. CB: cost based that consists on the direct costs, FDC: fully distributed cost (direct and indirect costs), LRIC: 
long run incremental cost. 
3. FE: fixed effects models, RE: Random effects models, IV: Instrumental Variable method. 
4. SUR: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions  
5. GMM: Generalized Method of moments is an advanced econometric models used by authors to control for 
reverse causality between access price regulation and innovation in telecom industry. Our reproach for this 
study that it ignores possibly problem of autocorrelation and heteroskedastic errors. 
6. This sub-index is computed by Zenhäusern et al.  (2007, 2012 a, 2012 b). It aggregate measures of regulatory 
price models adopted in a given countries for a given year. These measures are scores that associated as fol-
lows: no price control=0, price cap=0.5, FDC=0.8 and LRIC=1. LRIC therefore corresponds to the stringent 
regulatory access policy.  
 
Table 2.  Impacts of entry regulation 
Study Samples Econometric 
methods 
Measures of 
telecom innova-
tion (perfor-
mances) 
Measures of 
regulatory 
variable 
Results 
Friederiszick, 
Grajek and 
Röller (2008) 
200 operators 
(incumbent/ 
entrants and 
Fixed/mobile) 
in 30 European  
countries 
1997-2006 
OLS1  and IV 
with robust 
standard errors 
(control for 
reverse causality 
between regula-
tion and invest-
ment) 
Dynamic linear 
models) 
Infrastructure 
investment 
Sub-index that 
measure 
intensity of 
entry regula-
tion policies2  
Negative impact 
 Bauer and 
Shim (2012) 
See table 1 Sub-index that 
measure 
intensity of 
entry regula-
tion policies3 
Negative impact 
Grajek and 70 fixed opera- OLS and IV Infrastructure Sub-index that Negative impact on 
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Röller (2012) tors in 20 Euro-
pean countries 
1997-2006 
 
with robust 
standard errors 
(control for 
reverse causality 
between regula-
tion and invest-
ment) 
Dynamic linear 
models) 
investment by 
incumbent 
Infrastructure 
investment by 
entrants 
measure 
intensity of 
entry regula-
tion policies 
both  entrant and 
incumbent invest-
ment.4 
Ben Dkhil 
(2014 b) 
105 developed 
and developing 
countries 
FE-GMM-CUE 
FE-2SLS 
FE-GMM-2step 
Fixed Broadband 
penetration 
Sub-index that 
measures the 
intensity of 
entry regula-
tion computed 
by author as 
descripted in 
Ben Dkhil 
(2014 a) 
The  relationship 
between Entry 
regulation and the 
fixed broadband 
subscription is an 
inverted U shape: A 
moderate entry 
regulation policy 
leads to better 
results in term of 
telecom innovation 
than adopting 
stringent entry 
regulation policy. 
Notes:  
1. OLS: Ordinary least squares. 
2. This sub-index is computed by Zenhäusern et al.  (2007).It aggregate binaries variables that take a value of 
“1” if the correspondent entry regulatory policy (unbundling, separation and others) is mandated in a given 
countries for a given year. 
3. The same that used in Friederiszick, Grajek and Röller (2008) but updated to include data from 2007 to 
2010 (see Zenhäusern et al.  (2007, 2012 a, 2012 b).  
4. This study is different from Friederiszick, Grajek and Röller (2008) although it uses the same data. It study 
suggests to analyze empirically the competition-investment dilemma of regulators in dynamic context by 
estimating separate equations to analyze the effects of decision made by two actors ( may be entrant, in-
cumbent or regulator) to decision made by the rest of market players in a given national market. Results 
show first that regulation measured by aggregate measure (summing dummies for accounting separation 
and unbundling reforms) have negative impact on investment made by both overall industry and individual 
operator (incumbent or entrant) investment. Second, the higher the incumbent’s investment, the higher the 
regulation intensity (commitment problem). Third, authors show that there are a complementary strategy 
between incumbent and entrants (an increase in entrants’ investment due to low regulation intensity leads 
to the increase of the incumbent’s investment). 
 
Table 3. Impacts of unbundling policies 
Study Samples Econometric 
methods 
Measures of 
regulatory 
variable 
Measures of 
telecom inno-
vation (per-
formances) 
Results 
Martha 
(2005) 
100 devel-
oped and 
developing 
countries 
Year 2001 
OLS and 
Logit models 
(static linear 
models) 
Unbundling 
(dummy varia-
ble) 
Competition 
(dummy) 
Privatization 
(dummy) 
Broadband 
penetration 
Positive impact of un-
bundling and competition 
and no effect for privati-
zation 
The positive impact of 
unbundling in middle-
income countries is the 
highest. 
Grosso 
(2006) 
30 OECD 
countries 
2001-2004 
Annual panel 
data 
FE 
(dynamic 
linear specifi-
cation) 
Unbundling 
(dummy) 
Competition 
(market share 
of each firm in 
the industry) 
Broadband 
penetration 
Positive impact of un-
bundling policy and 
competition 
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Wallsten 
(2006) 
30 OECD 
countries 
1999-2003 
Annual panel 
data 
OLS and FE 
(static linear 
specifications) 
Full local loop 
unbundling 
(LLU) (dum-
my) 
Sub-loop un-
bundling 
(dummy) 
Bitstream 
unbundling 
(dummy) 
Number of 
years of each 
unbundling 
policy imple-
mentation 
(and others) 
Broadband 
penetration 
Lighter unbundling 
policies that consist to 
require full LLU of 
bitstream has no impact 
on broadband penetration 
while more intensive 
unbundling policies (sub-
loop unbundling) affects 
negatively broadband 
deployment. 
29 OECD 
Year 2003 
OLS 
(static linear 
specification) 
Broadband 
Speeds in Mb/s 
No impact of unbundling 
policies 
Gruber and 
Koutroumpis 
(2012) 
167developed 
and develop-
ing countries 
2000-2010 
Quarterly 
panel data 
IV (2SLS 
with country 
and year 
dummies and 
standard 
errors) 
Static linear 
models 
 LLU policies 
(dummies) 
Measures of 
competition 
(see table ) 
Broadband 
penetration 
Positive impact of un-
bundling policies 
Baccache, 
Brourreau 
and Germain 
(2013)  
15 European 
countries 
2002-2010 
Semester 
panel data 
Difference 
GMM with 
time fixed 
effects  
(dynamic  
linear models) 
Number of 
LLU lines 
controlled by 
entrants 
Number of 
bitstream lines 
controlled by 
entrants*  
 
Number of 
broadband lines 
owned by 
entrants 
Negative impact  
Conclusion of  these 
authors: 
There is no support to 
ladder of investment 
approach. Indeed, the 
bitstream access (LLU) 
does not shown to serve 
as « a stepping stone » for 
entrant to construct its 
LLU lines (its broadband 
lines ). 
Nardatto, 
Valleti and 
Verboven 
(2014) 
5000 local 
companies in 
UK  
2005-2009 
Quartly panel 
data 
FE and Sys-
tem GMM 
(static and 
dynamic 
linear models) 
LLU policy  
(dummy and 
number of 
companies that 
use LLU) 
Broadband 
penetration/ 
Broadband 
speed 
Unbundling does not 
increase significantly  
broadband penetration  
 
Positive impact on speeds 
(quality of retail service) 
when entrant differentiate 
its service relatively to 
incumbent 
Ben Dkhil 
(2014 b) 
105 devel-
oped and 
developing 
countries 
FE-GMM-
CUE 
FE-2SLS 
FE-GMM-
2step 
Fixed Broad-
band penetra-
tion 
Binary variables 
that takes one if 
the unbundling 
policy is adopt-
ed  
Positif impact of both full 
LLU and bitsream access 
on broadband adoption 
Negatif impact of subloop 
access on broadband 
adoption 
Note:  * In some specifications these variables are also interacted with the overall index of Plaut economy used by  
Bauer and Shim (2012) that measure the regulation intensity in telecom. 
Table 4. Impacts of separation policies 
Study Samples  method Measures of 
regulatory 
variable 
Measures of tele-
com innovation 
(performances) 
Results 
Viani 
(2006) 
67 countries 
1984-2003 
Annual panel 
data 
Robust FE 
clustering on 
countries 
(static linear 
models) 
Vertical separa-
tion of incum-
bent from 
international 
segment (dum-
Price of local fixed 
telephony 
“Outgoing interna-
tional minutes per 
person” 
Vertical separation has a negative 
impact on expansion of both local and 
international telephone services and it 
increases price of local telephone 
service. 
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my) Number of use fixed 
lines in minutes per 
person 
Bruno 
(2012) 
14 European 
operators (3 
separated  vs 
11 integrated 
incumbents) 
2005-2010 
Data Envelop-
ment Analysis 
(methods to 
estimate econ-
omies of verti-
cal integrations 
EVI)  
 
 efficiency 
scores measur-
ing economies 
of vertical 
integration 
Broadband lines Vertically separated operator are 
more efficient than vertically inte-
grated incumbents considering tradi-
tional retail service (narrow band 
lines) 
While for advanced retail service 
(broadband lines) efficiency of sepa-
rated firm decreases 
Ben 
Dkhil 
(2014 
b) 
105 devel-
oped and 
developing 
countries 
FE-GMM-CUE 
FE-2SLS 
FE-GMM-2step 
Fixed Broad-
band penetra-
tion 
Binary variables that 
takes one if the 
separation policy is 
adopted  
Positif impact of  
Accounting separation 
On broadband adoption 
Negatif impact of  
Functional separation on 
Broadband adoption 
Table 4. Impacts of overall regulation 
Study Samples Econome-
tric 
methods 
Measures of 
telecom 
innovation  
Measures of regula-
tory variable 
Results 
 Bauer and Shim 
(2012) 
          See  table 1 An overall index of 
Plaut Economy  that 
measure the overall 
regulation intensity in 
telecom* 
Negative impact on 
innovation 
Ben Dkhil 
(2014 b) 
105 devel-
oped and 
developing 
countries 
FE-GMM-
CUE 
FE-2SLS 
FE-GMM-
2step 
Fixed Broad-
band penetra-
tion 
Overall index 
for regulatory 
reforms re-
quired in fixed 
telecommunica-
tions computed 
by author as 
Ben Dkhil 
(2014 a)  
In the developed coun-
tries, the relationship 
between regulation and 
broadband adoption takes 
an inverted U form: a 
moderate regulation 
policy rises the broad-
band adoption while a 
restrictive regulation 
policy reduces broadband 
adoption. 
In the developing coun-
tries, this relation takes a 
U form which means a 
strict negative impact of 
regulation on broadband 
adoption. 
Notes: * This index is an aggregation of 20 indices:  indices measure price regulation, measures for entry regulation 
(i.e. unbundling, separation policies and others) and others. This indices are computed by Bauer and Shim (2012). 
Table 5. Impacts of regulation through the market outcome measurements (non-linear specification) 
Study Sample Econometric 
methods 
Measures of regula-
tory variable 
Measures of 
telecom inno-
vation (per-
formances) 
Results 
Hei-
meshoff 
(2007) 
30 OECD 
countries 
1990-2003 
(yearly 
panel data) 
First difference 
GMM estimator 
two step robust to 
heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrela-
tion 
(dynamic non- 
linear specifica-
tion) 
OECD indexes meas-
ure intensity of com-
petition (market struc-
ture) 
Investment per 
capita 
Inverted –U 
relationship be-
tween competition 
and investment 
Li (2008) 29 OECD Difference GMM Number of operators Number of Inverted-U rela-
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countries 
1991-2005 
Annual 
panel data 
and  2SLS 
(dynamic non-
linear models) 
(measure of competi-
tion) 
Privatization (dummy) 
Independency of 
regulatory bodies 
(dummy) 
subscriptions 
per 100 habit-
ants  
tionship between 
competition in 
mobile sector and 
number of sub-
scription per 100 
habitants 
Briglauer, 
Ecker and 
Gugler 
(2013) 
27 Euro-
pean coun-
tries 
2005-2011 
FE, Difference 
GMM and GMM-
system (to control 
for reverse causal-
ities) 
 
Measure of service 
based competition 
(percentage of unbun-
dling broadband lines) 
Measures of facilities 
based competition 
(Percentage of cable 
and DSL lines con-
trolled by en-
trants/Percentage of 
subscriber of 3G 
service) 
Number of fiber 
lines normal-
ized to popula-
tion 
Inverted U-
relationship be-
tween facilities 
based competition 
and fiber technol-
ogy deployment 
Service based 
competition 
undermine in-
vestment 
Table 6. Impacts of regulation through the market outcome measurements (linear specification) 
Study Sample Econometric 
methods 
Measures of telecom 
innovation (perfor-
mances) 
Measures of 
regulatory va-
riable 
Results 
Boylaud 
and 
Nicoletti 
(2000) 
23 OECD 
countries 
1991-1997 
(annual 
panel data) 
FE and RE 
(static mod-
els) 
Measures of service 
qualities (“call failure 
rate”, “fault clearance 
rate”, “answer seizure 
ratio”) 
Measure of Productivity 
in telecom industry (ratio 
of number of main lines 
to total employment,..)  
Prices (tariffs of differ-
ent final services) 
Number of com-
petitors 
Share of entrants 
Number of years 
of introduction of 
competition 
Index measures 
degree of state 
ownership 
Number of years 
since  the first sale 
of part of public 
telecom monopoly 
firm 
Competition in-
creases productivi-
ty and service 
quality and reduces 
prices. 
Privatization has 
no effect on quali-
ties and prices and 
negatively affects 
productivity. 
Li and Xu 
(2004) 
177 deve-
loped and 
developing 
countries 
1990-2001 
FE-robust 
2SLS with 
fixed effects, 
clustering on 
countries   
(control for 
reverse cau-
salities and 
autocorrela-
tion and 
heteroscedas-
tic errors) 
(static and 
dynamic  
specifica-
tions) 
Telecom investment per 
capita 
Price of three minute 
local call 
Labor productivity 
Scores for : 
Competition 
Partial privatiza-
tion 
Full privatization 
Full privatization 
and competition 
ameliorate telecom 
performance while 
partial privatiza-
tion has no effect. 
Alesina et 
al. (2005) 
21 OECD 
countries 
1975-1998 
GMM with 
fixed effects 
(control for 
reverse 
causalties) 
(dynamic) 
Investment (capital stock 
) 
Indexes computed 
by authors incor-
porating market 
share of entrant to 
measure competi-
tion and share of 
government in 
incumbent’s firm 
to measure privat-
ization 
Competition and 
privatization in-
crease investment  
Distaso, 14 Europe- FE, RE and Broadband penetration Herfindahl index- Inter-plaform 
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Lupi and  
Maneuti 
(2005) 
an coun-
tries 
2000-2004 
Panel 
quarterly 
data 
IV  
(control for 
reverse cau-
salities ) 
(static mo-
dels) 
es to measure 
inter-and intra-
platform competi-
tion computed by 
authors 
Access prices 
competition pro-
motes broadband 
deployment while 
competition in the 
DSL market ser-
vice has no signifi-
cant effect. 
London 
Economics 
(2006) 
25 Europe-
an coun-
tries 
2001-2004 
(annual 
panel data) 
Robust FE  Tangible fixed assets of 
operator 
OECD index or 
ECTA index  
 
Positive impact of 
regulation on 
investment 
Djiofack-
Zebaze 
and Keck 
(2009) 
177 coun-
tries (45 
Sub-
Saharan  
Africa and 
others) 
1997-2003 
OLS, GLS, 
2SLS, 3SLS, 
GMM  
Number of subscriptions 
and 
 
prices 
  
for end user service s 
(fixed, mobile , interna-
tional telephony)  
Liberalization 
(score for market 
structure)  
Dependency of 
regulatory bodies 
(dummy) 
Number of years 
from instauration 
of independent 
regulatory body , 
adoption of GATS 
and WTO com-
mitment 
Impact positive of 
regulation on 
telecom perfor-
mance 
Bouck-
aert, Dijk 
and Frank 
(2010) 
20 OECD 
countries 
2003-2008 
(quarterly 
panel data) 
FE  
(dynamic 
specifica-
tions) 
Broadband penetration Herfindahl indexes 
to measure inter-and 
intra-platform 
competition comput-
ed by authors 
 
Service based compe-
tition discourages 
broadband deploy-
ment. (no support for 
the Lader of invest-
ment approach) 
Gruber 
and Kou-
troumpis, 
(2012) See table 3 
Herfindahl index-
es to measure 
inter-and intra-
platform competi-
tion computed by 
authors. 
Both service based 
competition and 
facility based compe-
tition increase broad-
band deployment but 
the facility based 
competition has the 
greatest impact. 
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